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Abstract
Scoring protocols are a broad class of voting systems. Each is defined by a vector
(α1, α2, . . . , αm), α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm, of integers such that each voter contributes α1
points to his/her first choice, α2 points to his/her second choice, and so on, and any
candidate receiving the most points is a winner.
What is it about scoring-protocol election systems that makes some have the
desirable property of being NP-complete to manipulate, while others can be manipulated
in polynomial time? We find the complete, dichotomizing answer: Diversity of dislike.
Every scoring-protocol election system having two or more point values assigned to
candidates other than the favorite—i.e., having ||{αi |2 ≤ i ≤ m}|| ≥ 2—is NP-complete
to manipulate. Every other scoring-protocol election system can be manipulated in
polynomial time. In effect, we show that—other than trivial systems (where all
candidates alway tie), plurality voting, and plurality voting’s transparently disguised
translations—every scoring-protocol election system is NP-complete to manipulate.
1 Introduction
Voting provides is a broad framework for preference aggregation (see, e.g., [RO73,NR76,
AB00,BF02] for general background). Voting protocols are increasingly becoming natural to
consider not just in “human” settings, such as electing senators, but also in computational
settings, such as aggregating ranks of web pages and avoiding spam results from web searches
[DKNS01,FKS03], collaborative filtering [PHG00], and planning in automated multiagent
systems [ER93,ER91].
One central vulnerability of voting systems is that voters may not vote sincerely. The
universality of this worry became devastatingly clear in the 1970s through the famous
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Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem [Gib73,Sat75]: Every nondictatorial (i.e., no one voter
controls the outcome regardless of the preferences of the other voters) voting system among
three or more candidates is vulnerable to manipulation (i.e., has cases where some voter
does better by voting insincerely).
In “The Computational Complexity Difficulty of Manipulating an Election,” Bartholdi,
Tovey, and Trick ([BTT89a], see also [BO91]) suggested that in light of the impossibility of
having an election system remove any temptation to manipulate, one might at least seek
election systems that were computationally resistant to manipulation, i.e., in which a voter’s
task in deciding how to vote strategically was complex (e.g., NP-complete). They studied
unweighted voters in elections in which the number of candidates is unbounded and there is
exactly one strategic voter. For a number of specific election systems, they proved P results
and NP-completeness results.
Conitzer and Sandholm, and Conitzer, Lang, and Sandholm ([CS02,CLS03], henceforth
referred to collectively as “CS/CLS”) proposed and studied a somewhat different model:
Voters are weighted, and manipulation is being attempted not by a single voter but by a
coalition of strategic voters. Weighted voters are very natural in computational settings, but
also often occur in human settings. For example, in the past, all counties in New York State
other than the five of New York City used weighted voting systems—with different localities
having differing weights typically due to differing sizes—for their governance [Mal04] and,
though it is (due to the issue of “unfaithful electors” and the fact that a few states don’t
allocate their electors as a block) not a perfect example, the Electoral College, which chooses
the American president, is akin to a weighted voting system.
Studying weighted voters has a nice side benefit. As CS/CLS note, the NP-hardness
results of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89a] inherently (unless P = NP) depend—due
to the unweighted voter model—on the fact that the number of candidates is unbounded.
In contrast, in the CS/CLS model, NP-completeness results can meaningfully be obtained
even for elections limited to small, fixed numbers of candidates. CS/CLS study some
specific voting systems and obtain for them polynomial-time manipulation algorithms and
NP-hardness results. For the fixed scoring-protocol systems they studied—plurality, Borda,
and veto—they found the number of candidates (if any) where the manipulation complexity
changes from P to NP-complete (respectively, never, 3, and 3). Our dichotomy theorem
finds the broader pattern of which those are pieces.
That is, the goal of the present paper is to shift the analysis away from specific systems,
and instead to ask What is it about a voting system that makes its manipulation problem
easy or hard? We completely answer this question for the broad range of voting systems,
known as scoring protocols or scoring rules (see the handbook article [BF02]), which have
been widely studied in social choice theory.
An (m-candidate) scoring-protocol election system is defined by a vector
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(α1, α2, . . . , αm), α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm, of integers. Throughout this paper, each voter
orders the candidate completely and without ties. Formally, each voter has a preference
order that is irreflexive and antisymmetric (that is, each voter has strict preferences over the
candidates), complete (that is, each voter weighs in on all the candidates), and transitive.
And each voter contributes α1 points to his/her first choice, α2 points to his/her second
choice, and so on. Any candidate obtaining, overall, at least as many points as each other
candidate is a winner. The most important voting system—plurality voting a.k.a. plurality
rule a.k.a. first-past-the-post voting—is a scoring protocol with vector (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0), as is
the very common voting system based on ordinal ballots, Borda count a.k.a. preferential-
procedure voting, with vector (m,m − 1, . . . , 1), and as are veto voting a.k.a. inverse
plurality rule a.k.a. antiplurality rule (with vector (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0)), k-approval voting (with
vector (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0), starting with k 1’s), half-approval voting, in which half the m
candidates—the first ⌊m/2⌋ of them—in each voter’s ordering get 1 point each from that
voter and the rest get zero points each from that voter, and many more.1 We sometimes
take our m candidates to be implicitly named 1, 2, . . ., m.
For a fixed scoring-protocol election system defined by the vector of integers α =
(α1, α2, . . . , αm), α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm, following CS/CLS, the (Weighted) Manipulation
Problem, which we will denote MPα, is defined as:
(Weighted) Manipulation Problem, MPα
Given: A set S of weighted voters with preferences over (the same) m candidates, the
weights for a set T of voters, and a preferred candidate p from among them candidates.
Question: Is there a way to cast the votes in T such that p wins the election with respect
to α?
(As is standard, we assume the codings are the natural ones. S is input as a list, each element
of which contains a weight written in binary and a preference expressed as a permuted list
of the set {1, 2, . . . ,m}. T is input as a list, each element being a weight written in binary.)
For manipulating to create a unique (i.e., sole) winner, the manipulation problem is
analogously defined.
Unique (Weighted) Manipulation Problem, UMPα
Given: A set S of weighted voters with preferences over (the same) m candidates, the
weights for a set T of voters, and a preferred candidate p from among them candidates.
Question: Is there a way to cast the votes in T such that p is the unique winner of the
election with respect to α?
1Some complex-seeming systems also turn out to have very nice properties, e.g., in the case of half-
approval, regarding asymptotics of manipulating coalition size [PS].
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We prove that for any scoring-protocol election system, the manipulation problem in
both the “winner” and the “unique winner” versions is NP-complete exactly if ||{αi | 2 ≤
i ≤ m}|| ≥ 2. And for every scoring-protocol election system violating that condition, the
manipulation problem in both the “winner” and the “unique winner” versions is in P. That
is, we provide a dichotomy theorem that fully classifies the complexity of manipulation of
scoring-protocol election systems. In particular, every scoring-protocol election system—
other than trivial elections in which all candidates always tie, plurality voting, and an infinite
class of systems that are just transparently scaled/transformed clones of plurality voting
(see the proof of Theorem 2.1)—is NP-complete to manipulate. (And our NP-completeness
results apply to the actual, untainted election systems. We mention in passing that there
are papers that fight manipulation in a totally different way: by changing election systems
via adding an initial elimination round [CS03,EL].)
The above dichotomy theorem is for elections over fixed numbers of candidates, as that
is the standard model for scoring protocols. However, we note that our dichotomy theorem
extends naturally to a dichotomy theorem covering unbounded numbers of candidates.
2 Main Result: Dichotomy Theorem for Fixed Number of
Candidates
Theorem 2.1 For each m and each scoring protocol α = (α1, . . . , αm), MPα and UMPα
are in P if α2 = α3 = · · · = αm, and are NP-complete in all other cases.
In the proof of Theorem 2.1, we will use the following observation, which allows us to
put scoring protocols into a normal form.
Observation 2.2 Let α = (α1, α2, α3, . . . , αm) be a scoring protocol. Then, for all sets of
voters S and all candidates p, the following hold.
• For all integers k, α + k = (α1 + k, α2 + k, α3 + k, . . . , αm + k) is a scoring protocol
and p is a winner (unique winner) with respect to S and α if and only if p is a winner
(unique winner) with respect to S and α+ k.
• For all positive integers k, kα = (kα1, kα2, kα3, . . . , kαm) is a scoring protocol and
p is a winner (unique winner) with respect to S and α if and only if p is a winner
(unique winner) with respect to S and kα.
Proof Immediate from the observation that for all candidates c, the score of c with respect
to S and α+k is equal to (the score of c with respect to S and α) + k||S||, and the score of
c with respect to S and kα is equal to k times (the score of c with respect to S and α). ❑
Proof of Theorem 2.1 The “in P” part of this theorem is easy to see. If α1 = α2 =
α3 = · · · = αm, then all candidates are always tied, and so are all winners if ties are
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allowed, and are unique winners if and only if m = 1. If α1 > α2 = α3 = · · · = αm,
then, by Observation 2.2, winning in this protocol is equivalent to winning in the protocol
(1, 0, 0, . . . , 0), i.e., plurality, for which the manipulation problem is in P (this is mentioned
by CS/CLS and clearly holds, since p is a winner (unique winner) if and only if p is a winner
(unique winner) in the election that results when setting every vote in T to p > · · · ; we
mention in passing that this also works for an unbounded number of candidates).
It is immediate that MPα and UMPα are in NP for all scoring protocols (simply guess
the votes in T and evaluate the resulting election; it is clear that evaluating such an election
can be done in polynomial time). It remains to show that if it is not the case that α2 =
α3 = · · · = αm, then MPα and UMPα are NP-hard. We will prove this by a reduction from
the well-known NP-complete problem PARTITION:
Given: n (n ≥ 1) positive integers k1, . . . , kn that sum to 2K.
Question: Is there a subset of the integers that sums to K?
For the remainder of the proof, fix a scoring protocol α = (α1, . . . , αm) such that it is
not the case that α2 = α3 = · · · = αm. We will assume without loss of generality (see
Observation 2.2) that αm = 0.
Given a k1, . . . , kn,K whose membership in PARTITION we wish to test, we will in
polynomial time construct a set of voters S, the weights for voters in T , and a preferred
candidate p such that
• If there exists a subset of k1, . . . , kn that sums to K, then the votes in T can be cast
such that p becomes a unique winner (with respect to S ∪ T ).
• If the votes in T can be cast in such a way that p becomes a winner, then there exists
a subset of k1, . . . , kn that sums to K.
Note that this shows NP-hardness for MPα and UMPα.
Let ℓ = ||{i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m and αi = 0}|| − 1. Since αm = 0, ℓ ≥ 0. Let r = m − ℓ − 3.
Since α2 6= 0, r ≥ 0. Our election consists of the following m candidates: p, a, b, c1, . . . , cℓ
and d1, . . . , dr.
The set of voters S will consist of two parts, S = S1 ∪ S2. S1 will ensure that the
reduction works if we look only at candidates a, b, p, and c1, . . . , cℓ. S2 will ensure that
there is no interference from the padding candidates d1, . . . , dr.
First suppose that ℓ 6= 1 (we will need a slightly different construction for ℓ = 1, which
we will describe after the proof of the ℓ 6= 1 case).
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The ℓ 6= 1 case
S1 consists of the following voters:
• One voter of weight 2K(2α1 − αr+2)− 1 of the form
a > d1 > · · · > dr > b > p > c1 > · · · > cℓ.
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• One voter of weight 2K(2α1 − αr+2)− 1 of the form
b > d1 > · · · > dr > a > p > c1 > · · · > cℓ.
• For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, one voter of weight 4α1K − 1 of the form
ci > d1 > · · · > dr > c1+(i mod ℓ) > a > b > p > · · · ,
where the final “· · · ” means that the remaining candidates follow in some arbitrary
order.
For V a set of voters and c a candidate, define scoreV (c) as the score of candidate c with
respect to V (and α).
It is easy to verify that the scores of the candidates with respect to S1 are as follows:
1. scoreS1(p) = 0.
2. scoreS1(a) = scoreS1(b) = (2K(2α1 − αr+2)− 1)(α1 + αr+2).
3. scoreS1(ci) = (4α1K − 1)(α1 + αr+2), for each 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
4. scoreS1(di) ≤ scoreS1(d1) = (2(2K(2α1 − αr+2) − 1) + ℓ(4α1K − 1))α2, for each 1 ≤
i ≤ r.
Note that the candidates di have (potentially) very high scores. We will define a set of
voters S2 that will ensure that the di’s will not interfere with p winning the election. In
order to do so, we will use the following claim. (Note that our scoring protocol is fixed, so
ℓ and r are fixed. So the “polynomial time” below is in the context of these fixed ℓ and r,
with s our variable.)
Claim 2.3 For every positive integer s, there exists a set of voters (each having a weight and
a preference order) S2 over candidates {p, a, b, c1, . . . , cℓ, d1, . . . , dr} such that scoreS2(p) =
scoreS2(x) for all x ∈ {a, b, c1, . . . , cℓ}, and scoreS2(di) + s ≤ scoreS2(p) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
From s, in polynomial time (in |s|) we may compute such an S2.
2It would be tempting to instead say “2K(2α1 −αr+2)− 1 voters of weight 1 of the form a > d1 > · · · >
dr > b > p > c1 > · · · > cℓ.” But note that that is invalid as such a set of voters takes exponential space (in
the length of the input), since the integers in PARTITION are in binary. (The unary version of PARTITION
is in P.) For this reason, the proofs of [CS02, Theorems 1–4] and [CLS03, Theorems 2 and 7] are technically
incorrect, though these proofs can easily be fixed by handling things with high-weight voters as above.
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We will prove this claim at the end of the ℓ 6= 1 case of Theorem 2.1.
Let S2 be a set of voters such that scoreS2(p) = scoreS2(x) for all x ∈ {a, b, c1, . . . , cℓ},
and scoreS2(di)+ scoreS1(d1) < scoreS2(p) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r. The existence and polynomial-
time computability of such an S2 follow from Claim 2.3, applied with s = scoreS1(d1) + 1.
Let S = S1 ∪ S2, and set the weights of T to
2k1(α1 + αr+2), 2k2(α1 + αr+2), . . . , 2kn(α1 + αr+2).
We will show that we have obtained the desired reduction.
First suppose that there exists a subset of k1, . . . , kn that sums to K. We need to show
that we can cast the votes in T in such a way that p becomes the unique winner (with
respect to S ∪ T ).
Let I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be such that
∑
i∈I ki = K. There are n voters in T , and we will
view these voters as numbered from 1 to n in such a way that the ith voter in T has weight
2ki(α1 + αr+2). For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, set the vote of the ith voter in T to
p > d1 > · · · > dr > a > b > c1 > · · · > cℓ if i ∈ I
and to
p > d1 > · · · > dr > b > a > c1 > · · · > cℓ if i 6∈ I.
This is in the current setting equivalent to having one voter of weight 2K(α1+αr+2) of the
form
p > d1 > · · · > dr > a > b > c1 > · · · > cℓ
and one voter of weight 2K(α1 + αr+2) of the form
p > d1 > · · · > dr > b > a > c1 > · · · > cℓ.
Let s2 = scoreS2(p). Recall that scoreS2(a) = s2, scoreS2(b) = s2, and scoreS2(ci) = s2
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. We obtain the following scores (with respect to S ∪ T ).
1. score(p) = s2 + 4α1K(α1 + αr+2).
2. score(a) = score(b) = (2K(2α1 − αr+2)− 1)(α1 + αr+2) + s2 + 2K(α1 + αr+2)αr+2 =
s2 + (2K(2α1 − αr+2) − 1 + 2Kαr+2)(α1 + αr+2) = s2 + (4Kα1 − 1)(α1 + αr+2), for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. This is less than score(p).
3. score(ci) = (4α1K − 1)(α1 +αr+2) + s2, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. This is less than score(p).
4. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ r, score(di) ≤ score(d1) = scoreS(d1) + scoreT (d1) < scoreS(p) +
scoreT (p) = score(p) (the “<” is due to our choice of S2 and the preferences of the
voters in T ).
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It follows that p is the unique winner of this election, as required.
For the converse, suppose the votes in T are cast in such a way that p is a winner of the
election. Without loss of generality, assume that p is the most preferred candidate in the
preference order of each voter in T . Then score(p) = s2 + 4α1K(α1 + αr+2).
We will now show that, for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, scoreT (ci) = 0. Suppose that for some i it
holds that scoreT (ci) > 0. Since all weights of T are multiples of 2(α1+αr+2), it follows that
scoreT (ci) ≥ 2(α1+αr+2). But then score(ci) ≥ (4α1K−1)(α1+αr+2)+s2+2(α1+αr+2) =
s2+(4α1K+1)(α1+αr+2) > score(p). This contradicts the assumption that p is a winner.
Recall that there are only ℓ+ 1 0’s in α. Since scoreT (ci) = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, each voter
in T must have at least one of a or b somewhere between (inclusively) 1st and (r + 2)nd in
his/her preference order. So it follows that
scoreT (a) + scoreT (b) ≥ 4K(α1 + αr+2)αr+2.
Suppose that scoreT (a) > 2K(α1 + αr+2)αr+2. Since all weights of T are multiples of
2(α1 + αr+2), it follows that scoreT (a) ≥ 2K(α1 + αr+2)αr+2 + 2(α1 + αr+2) = (2Kαr+2 +
2)(α1+αr+2). Then (keeping in mind our choice of S2) score(a) ≥ (2K(2α1−αr+2)−1)(α1+
αr+2)+ s2+(2Kαr+2+2)(α1+αr+2) = s2+(2K(2α1−αr+2)+1+2Kαr+2)(α1+αr+2) =
s2+(4Kα1+1)(α1+αr+2). This is greater than score(p). This contradicts the assumption
that p is a winner.
Since a and b are completely symmetric, it follows that scoreT (a) = scoreT (b) = 2K(α1+
αr+2)αr+2. But then the weights of those voters in T who prefer a to b sum to 2K(α1+αr+2).
This implies that there is a subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that
∑
i∈I 2ki(α1+αr+2) = 2K(α1+
αr+2). It follows that
∑
i∈I ki = K.
To finish the proof of the ℓ 6= 1 case, it remains to prove Claim 2.3, i.e., to construct in
time polynomial in |s| a set of voters S2 over candidates {p, a, b, c1, . . . , cℓ, d1, . . . , dr} such
that scoreS2(p) = scoreS2(x) for all x ∈ {a, b, c1, . . . , cℓ}, and scoreS2(di) + s ≤ scoreS2(p)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
Proof of Claim 2.3 If r = 0, we simply take S2 = ∅. So, assume that r > 0. In the
construction of S2, we will use cyclic shifts of preference orders in order to make sure that
certain candidates tie. We introduce the following notation.
For a preference order a0 > a1 > · · · > ak−1, and integer t, [a0 > a1 > · · · > ak−1]t→,
denotes the preference order that results after a cyclic shift of t positions to the right, i.e.,
the preference order at mod k > a(t+1) mod k > · · · > a(t+k−1) mod k.
S2 is defined as follows.
• For every i, 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ+2, and every j, 0 ≤ j ≤ r− 1, a voter of weight s of the form:
[a > b > p > c1 > · · · > cℓ]i→ > [d1 > · · · > dr]j→.
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So, S2 consists of (ℓ+3)r voters, each of weight s. Clearly, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, scoreS2(p) =
scoreS2(a) = scoreS2(b) = scoreS2(ci), as required.
It remains to show that, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ r, scoreS2(di) + s ≤ scoreS2(p). Note that
scoreS2(p) = rs(α1+· · ·+αℓ+3) and scoreS2(di) = (ℓ+3)s(αℓ+3+1+· · ·+αm). In light of this,
scoreS2(di) + s ≤ scoreS2(p) will clearly follow if we can establish that r(α1+ · · ·+αℓ+3) >
(ℓ+3)(αℓ+3+1+ · · ·+αm). But that indeed holds, since r(α1+ · · ·+αℓ+3) ≥ r(ℓ+3)αℓ+3 =
(m− ℓ−3)αℓ+3(ℓ+3) ≥ (αℓ+3+1+ · · ·+αm)(ℓ+3), and the leftmost “≥” is strict whenever
αℓ+3 = 0 and the rightmost “≥” is strict whenever αℓ+3 6= 0.
So, we have scoreS2(p)− scoreS2(di) ≥ s. ❑ Claim 2.3
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.1 for the case that ℓ 6= 1. Note that the
construction given above does not work for ℓ = 1. We will now modify the previous
construction to get a construction for the ℓ = 1 case.
The ℓ = 1 case
S1 consists of the following voters:
• One voter of weight 3K(2α1 − αr+2)− 1 of the form
a > d1 > · · · > dr > b > p > c1.
• One voter of weight 3K(2α1 − αr+2)− 1 of the form
b > d1 > · · · > dr > a > p > c1.
• The following six voters, each of weight 3α1K − 1:
c1 > d1 > · · · > dr > a > b > p,
a > d1 > · · · > dr > c1 > b > p,
c1 > d1 > · · · > dr > b > a > p,
b > d1 > · · · > dr > c1 > a > p,
c1 > d1 > · · · > dr > p > a > b, and
p > d1 > · · · > dr > c1 > a > b.
It is easy to verify that the scores of the candidates with respect to S1 are as follows:
1. scoreS1(p) = (3α1K − 1)(α1 + αr+2).
2. scoreS1(a) = scoreS1(b) = (3K(2α1 − αr+2)− 1)(α1 + αr+2) + scoreS1(p).
3. scoreS1(c1) = 2(3α1K − 1)(α1 + αr+2) + scoreS1(p).
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4. scoreS1(di) ≤ scoreS1(d1) = (2(3K(2α1 − αr+2) − 1) + 6(3α1K − 1))α2, for each
1 ≤ i ≤ r.
Let S2 be a set of voters such that scoreS2(p) = scoreS2(x) for all x ∈ {a, b, c1}, and
scoreS2(di)+ scoreS1(d1) ≤ scoreS2(p) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r. The existence and polynomial-time
computability of such an S2 follow from Claim 2.3, applied with s = scoreS1(d1).
Let S = S1 ∪ S2, and set the weights of T to
3k1(α1 + αr+2), 3k2(α1 + αr+2), . . . , 3kn(α1 + αr+2).
We will show that that we have obtained the desired reduction.
First suppose that there exists a subset of k1, . . . , kn that sums to K. We need to show
that we can cast the votes in T in such a way that p becomes the unique winner (with
respect to S ∪ T ).
Let I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be such that
∑
i∈I ki = K. There are n voters in T , and we will
view these voters as numbered from 1 to n in such a way that the ith voter in T has weight
3ki(α1 + αr+2). For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, set the vote of the ith voter in T to
p > d1 > · · · > dr > a > b > c1 if i ∈ I
and to
p > d1 > · · · > dr > b > a > c1 if i 6∈ I.
This is in the current setting equivalent to having one voter of weight 3K(α1+αr+2) of the
form
p > d1 > · · · > dr > a > b > c1
and one voter of weight 3K(α1 + αr+2) of the form
p > d1 > · · · > dr > b > a > c1.
Let s1 = scoreS1(p) and let s2 = scoreS2(p). Recall that, by our choice of S2, scoreS2(a) =
s2, scoreS2(b) = s2, and scoreS2(c1) = s2. We obtain the following scores (with respect to
S ∪ T ).
1. score(p) = s1 + s2 + 6α1K(α1 + αr+2).
2. score(a) = score(b) = s1+(3K(2α1−αr+2)−1)(α1+αr+2)+s2+3K(α1+αr+2)αr+2 =
s1+s2+(3K(2α1−αr+2)−1+3Kαr+2)(α1+αr+2) = s1+s2+(6Kα1−1)(α1+αr+2).
This is less than score(p).
3. score(c1) = (6α1K − 2)(α1 + αr+2) + s1 + s2. This is less than score(p).
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4. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ r, score(di) = scoreS1(di) + scoreS2(di) + scoreT (di) ≤ scoreS1(d1) +
scoreS2(di) + scoreT (d1) ≤ scoreS2(p) + scoreT (p) < score(p) (the rightmost “≤” is
due to our choice of S2 and the preferences of the voters in T ).
It follows that p is the unique winner of this election, as required.
For the converse, suppose the votes in T are cast in such a way that p is a winner of the
election. Without loss of generality, assume that p is the most preferred candidate in the
preference order of each voter in T . Then score(p) = s1 + s2 + 6α1K(α1 + αr+2).
We will now show that scoreT (c1) = 0. Suppose that scoreT (c1) > 0. Since all weights
of T are multiples of 3(α1 + αr+2), it follows that scoreT (c1) ≥ 3(α1 + αr+2). But then
score(c1) ≥ (6α1K−2)(α1+αr+2)+s1+s2+3(α1+αr+2) = s1+s2+(6α1K+1)(α1+αr+2) >
score(p). This contradicts the assumption that p is a winner.
Recall that there are only two 0’s in α. Since scoreT (c1) = 0, each voter in T must
have at least one of a or b somewhere between (inclusively) 1st and (r + 2)nd in his/her
preference order, so it follows that
scoreT (a) + scoreT (b) ≥ 6K(α1 + αr+2)αr+2.
Suppose that scoreT (a) > 3K(α1 + αr+2)αr+2. Since all weights of T are multiples of
3(α1 + αr+2), it follows that scoreT (a) ≥ 3K(α1 + αr+2)αr+2 + 3(α1 + αr+2) = (3Kαr+2 +
3)(α1 + αr+2). Then (keeping in mind our choice of S2) score(a) ≥ (3K(2α1 − αr+2) −
1)(α1 + αr+2) + s1 + s2 + (3Kαr+2 + 3)(α1 + αr+2) = s1 + s2 + (3K(2α1 − αr+2) + 2 +
3Kαr+2)(α1+αr+2) = s1+ s2+(6Kα1+2)(α1+αr+2). This is greater than score(p). This
contradicts the assumption that p is a winner.
Since a and b are completely symmetric, it follows that scoreT (a) = scoreT (b) = 3K(α1+
αr+2)αr+2. But then the weights of those voters in T who prefer a to b sum to 3K(α1+αr+2).
This implies that there is a subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that
∑
i∈I 3ki(α1+αr+2) = 3K(α1+
αr+2). It follows that
∑
i∈I ki = K. ❑
3 Unbounded Numbers of Candidates
Our main result, Theorem 2.1, is for the case of fixed numbers of candidates. However,
intuitively, some voting systems “feel” as if they should handle arbitrary number of
candidates. For example, the family of score vectors (1), (1, 0), (1, 0, 0), . . . taken together
correctly capture a notion of plurality voting that is not bound to a particular number of
candidates. To generalize our main theorem to unbounded numbers of voters, we need a
way to specify such families of scoring vectors. We do so in what seems the most natural
way: We require there to be an efficient function that generates the score vectors. Let
Z denote the integers. Let us say that a function f is a general scoring function if f is
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polynomial-time computable and, for each m ≥ 1,
f(0m) = {(α1, α2, . . . , αm) ∈ Z
m | α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm}.
By an election with respect to f , we mean exactly the natural notion: If a given input has
m candidates, we conduct the election with respect to the scoring rule f(0m).
So, we may now state our regular and unique problems for the case of scoring protocols
that apply to unbounded numbers of candidates. For each general scoring function f , we
define the following two problems (unlike MPα and UMPα where m is fixed by α, here m
is a variable determined by the preferences that are part of the input).
General (Weighted) Manipulation Problem, GMPf
Given: A set S of weighted voters with preferences over (the same) m candidates, the
weights for a set T of voters, and a preferred candidate p from among them candidates.
Question: Is there a way to cast the votes in T such that p wins the election with respect
to f(0m)?
General Unique (Weighted) Manipulation Problem, GUMPf
Given: A set S of weighted voters with preferences over (the same) m candidates, the
weights for a set T of voters, and a preferred candidate p from among them candidates.
Question: Is there a way to cast the votes in T such that p is the unique winner of the
election with respect to f(0m)?
It is not hard to see that our main theorem’s result extends to these cases as follows.
Here, f(0m)i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, denotes the ith component of the arity-m vector f(0
m).
Theorem 3.1 For each general scoring function f , GMPf and GUMPf are in P if
(∀m ≥ 1)(∀k, ℓ : 2 ≤ k, ℓ ≤ m)[f(0m)k = f(0
m)ℓ],
and are NP-complete in all other cases.
(Just to be clear, what this says regarding the P case is that for allm, if one takes the vector
output by f(0m) and chops off its first component, then all the remaining components, if
any, are equal to each other.)
Let us explain why this theorem holds for the case of GMPf . (The GUMPf case is
analogous.) Fix a general scoring function f . Recall that f is polynomial-time computable.
If (∀m ≥ 1)(∀k, ℓ : 2 ≤ k, ℓ ≤ m)[f(0m)k = f(0
m)ℓ], the same approach that gave P
algorithms in the bounded candidate case works here. (Of course, the algorithm will
dynamically generate the scoring vector, and then will use the appropriate strategy. It is
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easy to see that overall this is a polynomial-time algorithm here. This is basically because
there were only a finite number of cases underlying the earlier polynomial-time result, so our
composite, dynamic algorithm is easily seen to run in polynomial time.) On the other hand,
suppose it is not the case that (∀m ≥ 1)(∀k, ℓ : 2 ≤ k, ℓ ≤ m)[f(0m)k = f(0
m)ℓ]. Then note
that there must exist some m′ such that the fixed-number-of-candidates problem MPf(0m′ )
is—via Theorem 2.1—NP-complete. Then clearly our problem GMPf is NP-hard, since we
have a many-one polynomial-time reduction from the NP-complete problem MPf(0m′ ) to
GMPf , namely, simply pass forward all the same voters, preferences, and weights. Also, it
is directly clear that GMPf belongs to NP. Thus, GMPf is indeed NP-complete.
4 Conclusions
There are some election systems for which even determining the winner is hard (see,
e.g., [BTT89b,HHR97,HSV03,RSV03]). Nonetheless, one central goal in the complexity-
theoretic study of elections is to find natural, attractive election systems whose winner-
evaluation problems are computationally simple but that nonetheless are hard to
manipulate.
Scoring protocols all clearly have winner-evaluation problems that are in P. And the
dichotomy result of this paper shows that—except for some trivial systems and plurality
rule in various guises—all scoring-protocol election systems are NP-complete to manipulate.
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